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Secure Remote User Authenticated Key
Establishment Protocol for Smart Home
Environment
Mohammad Wazid, Student Member, IEEE, Ashok Kumar Das, Member, IEEE, Vanga Odelu,
Neeraj Kumar, Member, IEEE, and Willy Susilo, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has been used in wide range of applications, such as smart living,
smart health and smart transportation. Among all these applications, smart home is most popular, in which the users/residents can
control the various smart sensor devices of home by using the ICT. However, the smart devices and users communicate over an
insecure communication channel, i.e., the Internet. There might be the possibility of various types of attacks, such as smart device
capture attack, user, gateway node and smart device impersonation attacks and privileged-insider attack on a smart home network. An
illegal user, in this case, can gain access over data sent by the smart devices. Most of the existing schemes reported in the literature
for the remote user authentication in smart home environment are not secure with respect to the above specified attacks. Thus, there is
need to design a secure remote user authentication scheme for a smart home network so that only authorized users can have access
to the smart devices. To mitigate the aforementioned isses, in this paper, we propose a new secure remote user authentication scheme
for a smart home environment. The proposed scheme is efficient for resource-constrained smart devices with limited resources as it
uses only one-way hash functions, bitwise XOR operations and symmetric encryptions/decryptions. The security of the scheme is
proved using the rigorous formal security analysis under the widely-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model. Moreover, the rigorous
informal security analysis and formal security verification using the broadly-accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool is also done. Finally, the practical demonstration of the proposed scheme is also performed
using the widely-accepted NS-2 simulation.
Index Terms—Smart home, user authentication, key agreement, provable security, AVISPA, NS2 simulation.
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I NTRODUCTION

The advancement of ICT and the Internet have provided the support for rapid growth in smart home environments. A smart home
contains the advanced automation systems for monitoring and
controlling of various smart devices. In a smart home, the residents
can control various smart sensing devices such as temperature
monitoring sensors, lighting equipments sensors, or occupancy
sensors, etc. [1], [2], [3], [4]. The smart home environment
provides a high level of comfort with reduced operational costs
to provide safety and security to its residents [5]. One of the
major advantages of this type of environment is for the elderly and
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disabled people in which these people get assistance in estimating
their body parameters using smart gadgets [6]. A smart home is
equipped with a number of smart devices (SDj s), such as lowcost sensors, smart light controllers, smart window shutters, smart
AC controllers various and surveillance cameras. Most of the
SDj s are resource-constrained having limited computational and
communication power, and limited battery backup [5]. A smart
home network can be implemented with the help of these SDj s
in which all SDj s communicate over wireless channels using
the home gateway node (GW N ). The GW N acts as a bridge
between SDj s and smart home user (Ui ). The GW N provides
interoperability and control for the SDj s and connects them to
the external world using the Internet. This facilitates the Ui s to
operate the smart home appliances remotely using the Internetenabled smartphones, tablets, etc. anytime from anywhere in the
world [5], [7].
1.1 Network Model
The network model depicted in Fig. 1 consists of the smart home
users Ui s who want to access smart devices SDj s as per their
requirements. Suppose there is a user Ui , who wants to access
certain SDj (e.g. temperature & humidity sensor). To access
that SDj , Ui first needs to register himself/herself at the trusted
registration authority RA. Similarly, all SDj s and the gateway
node GW N (which acts as the bridge between the SDj and
Ui , and connects SDj to the external world using the Internet)
are also registered at the RA. The GW N is thus a special node
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that takes responsibility of controlling the network data, device
and network interoperability and secure management [5]. The
registration authority (RA) is a trusted server and it is responsible
for registering all the smart devices, users Ui ’s and the GW N
securely. After the successful registration of Ui , SDj and GW N
securely, the RA stores this useful information in the memory
of smart phone SPi of Ui , and also in the memory of SDj and
GW N , which are further used at the time of authentication and
key establishment process. Ui , who wants to access a SDj , sends
an authentication request directly to the GW N as both of them
have already performed the registration phase at the RA. Three
categories of mutual authentications happen: 1) between Ui and
GW N , 2) between GW N and SDj and 3) between Ui and
SDj . Moreover, Ui and SDj establish a secret session key SKij
between them to protect the exchanged messages.

2

as smart device capture attack, user, gateway node and smart
device impersonation attacks, and privileged-insider attack. Most
of those schemes also fail to preserve traceability and anonymity
properties of the users, the GW N as well as of the smart
devices SDj s. Moreover, using the smart phone stolen attack,
it is possible that an adversary A can capture a user’s secret
credentials, such as identity, password and biometrics key with
the help of the extracted information stored in the smart phone.
In addition, with the help of the user, gateway node and smart
device impersonation attacks, A can create valid messages on the
behalf of a user Ui , GW N and smart device SDj , respectively,
and can send the corresponding messages to Ui , GW N and SDj
so that these messages are treated as valid by Ui , GW N and
SDj , respectively. In a privileged-insider attack, an insider user
of the RA can act as an adversary. The privileged-insider of the
RA being an adversary can use the registration information of the
users sent to the RA by a legal Ui during the registration phase
and derive user’s secret credentials, such as identity, password
and biometrics key. However, the GW N registration is usually
performed in offline mode securely by the RA, and hence, an
adversary can not compromise the sensitive information stored in
the tamper-resistant GW N device. Considering various possible
attacks in a smart home environment, there is a great need to
design a secure remote user authentication scheme suitable for a
smart home network so that only authorized users can access the
information collected by the deployed SDj s.
1.3 Threat Model
•

Fig. 1. Smart home environment (Adapted from [5])
•

1.2

Motivation

Consider the following scenario in smart home environment [8].
Recently, it is noticed that the major trend throughout Europe is the
aging society, which is affected by an increasing life expectancy
and decreasing birth rates. A large proportion of the European
society will be not only from the group of people over 65, but
also from a significant increase in the number of people over 80.
The proportion of population aged over 65 and over is rising in all
countries, however differences can be observed. It is also reported
that “the ratio for Iceland, Ireland, Slovak Republic and Turkey lie
well below the average for Europe, whereas the ratio for Finland,
Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden lie far above the average for
Europe” [8].
The SDj s in smart homes communicate over the insecure
communication channels. There might be the possibility of various
attacks in a smart home network. An illegal user (attacker), who
can monitor the activities in a smart home, can break the security,
and also can gain access over the SDj s and other smart home
appliances. For example, the attacker can watch the activities in
the home by accessing the surveillance camera illegally where
disabled people live in the smart home. Most of the existing
authentication schemes reported in the literature in a smart home
environment are not secure against various known attacks, such

•

•

We have used the Dolev-Yao threat model [9] in our
scheme. According to this model, any two communicating
parties communicate over an insecure channel and the endpoint entities such as Ui and SDj are not considered as
trusted entities. An adversary, say A, can eavesdrop the
exchanged messages, and also can modify or delete the
message contents during transmission.
It is assumed that an adversary can physically capture
some smart devices equipped at the smart home which
are not tamper-resistant, and can extract all the sensitive
data stored in those devices.
As in [5], we also assume that the GW N is fully trusted
and can not be compromised by an adversary. Otherwise,
the whole network is compromised if the GW N is compromised. For this purpose, as in Bertino et al.’s scheme
[10], we also assume that the GW N is equipped with the
tamper-resistant device so that all the sensitive information
including the cryptographic keying materials stored in it is
protected from A. Hence, the use of a tamper-resistant
GW N makes the security of the proposed scheme is
strong enough. Though the attacks on tamper-resistant
devices are possible, the attacker A needs a special equipment to perform attacks to extract the information. Since it
is cheaper to install the GW N than the special equipment,
so A does not have economic incentives to mount such
an attack [10]. Moreover, the GW N can be physically
secured by putting it under a locking system inside the
smart home of a user so that the physical capture of the
GW N can be much difficult as compared to that for the
smart devices.
The RA is also fully trusted and can not be compromised
by an adversary.
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1.4

Contributions

Based upon the above discussion, the following contributions are
presented in this paper:
•

•

•

•

•

1.5

We propose a new remote user authentication scheme for
securing a smart home network. The proposed scheme
allows three types of mutual authentications: 1) between a
user Ui and the GW N , 2) between the GW N and a smart
device SDj , and 3) a user Ui and a smart device SDj . At
the end, a symmetric session key is established between Ui
and SDj , and they can use the established symmetric key
for their future secure communications using a symmetric
cipher (for example, the stateless CBC (Cipher Block
Chaining) mode of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES-128), known as AES-CBC [11], [12], [13]).
The proposed scheme is suitable and efficient for resourceconstrained SDj s with limited resources as it uses only
hash invocations, simple bitwise XOR operations and
symmetric encryption/decryption operations.
The security of the proposed scheme is proved using
the formal security analysis under the widely-accepted
ROR model [14], and also using the rigorous informal
security analysis. The formal security discussed in Section
5.1 proves the semantic security of the proposed scheme
against an adversary to get the session key between a user
and a smart device in the smart home environment. On the
other hand, using the informal security analysis, we have
shown that the proposed scheme is secure against other
possible known attacks, which are discussed in detail in
Section 5.3.
The formal security verification of the proposed scheme in
Section 5.2 is done using the broadly-used AVISPA tool
[15] and the simulation results show that it is also secure
against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Finally, the practical demonstration of the proposed
scheme is provided through the widely-accepted NS-2
simulation [16].

Roadmap of the Paper

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We briefly discuss
the relevant mathematical preliminaries in Section 2. A brief
survey of various existing schemes proposed in the literature is
given in Section 3. A new user authentication and session key
agreement scheme for smart home environment is presented in
Section 4. The rigorous formal and informal security analysis are
given in Section 5. In addition, the formal security verification
using the popular AVISPA tool is also given in this section. The
practical demonstration of the proposed scheme using widelyaccepted NS-2 simulation is given in Section 6. The performance
comparison with the existing relevant schemes is given in Section
7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the article.

2

M ATHEMATICAL P RELIMINARIES

In this section, we briefly discuss the one-way cryptographic hash
function and its properties, and also the indistinguishability of
encryption under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), which are
necessary to analyze the security of the proposed scheme.

3

2.1 One-way Cryptographic Hash Function
A one-way cryptographic hash function h: {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
takes an arbitrary-length input, say x ∈ {0, 1}∗ , and outputs a
fixed-length (say, l-bits) message digest h(x) ∈ {0, 1}l .
Definition 1. As defined in [17], the formalization of an adversary
HASH
A’s advantage in finding hash collision is given by AdvA
(t)
= P r[(a, b) ←R A: a 6= b and h(a) = h(b)], where P r[X]
denotes the probability of an event X , and (a, b) ←R A denotes
the pair (a, b) is randomly selected by A. In this case, A is
allowed to be probabilistic and the probability in the advantage is
computed over the random choices made by A with the execution
time t. By an (ǫ, t)-adversary A attacking the collision resistance
of h(·), it is meant that the runtime of A is at most t and that
HASH
AdvA
(t) ≤ ǫ.
2.2 Indistinguishability of Encryption Under Chosen
Plaintext Attack
The indistinguishability of encryption under chosen plaintext
attack (IND-CPA) is formally defined as follows [18], [19]:
Definition 2. Let SE/M E be the single/multiple eavesdropper
respectively, and ORek1 , ORek2 , . . ., ORekN be N different
independent encryption oracles associated with encryption keys
ek1 , ek2 , . . . , ekN , respectively. The advantage functions of SE
IN D−CP A
(k) =
and M E are defined, respectively, as AdvΩ,SE
|2P r[SE ← ORek1 ; (p0 , p1 ←R SE); δ ←R {0, 1};
IN D−CP A
(k) =
β ←R ORek1 (pδ ) : SE(β) = δ]−1|, and AdvΩ,M
E
|2P r[M E ← ORek1 , . . ., ORekN ; (p0 , p1 ←R M E);
δ ←R {0, 1}; β1 ←R ORek1 (pδ ), . . ., βN ←R ORekN (pδ ):
M E(β1 , . . ., βN ) = δ] − 1|, where Ω is the encryption scheme.
We call Ω is IND-CPA secure in the single (multiple) eavesdropper
IN D−CP A
IN D−CP A
setting if AdvΩ,SE
(k) (respectively, AdvΩ,M
(k))
E
is negligible (in the security parameter k ) for any probabilistic,
polynomial time adversary SE (M E ).
A deterministic encryption scheme means the same message,
when it is encrypted twice, yields the same ciphertext. Thus,
any deterministic encryption scheme is not IND-CPA secure [13].
There are five modes of symmetric encryption: Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback
(CFB), Output Feedback (OFB) and Counter (CTR). Out of these
modes, ECB is not IND-CPA secure [13]. Since the adversary
knows the Initialization Vector (IV ), CBC is essentially reduced
to ECB, and hence, the stateful CBC is IND-CPA insecure [13].
On the other hand, in the stateless CBC, the IV value is chosen
at random for each message, and due to this property, the stateless
CBC is IND-CPA secure [13]. If the stateless CBC of AES-128
symmetric encryption scheme is used for encryption/decryption
purpose, it then becomes IND-CPA secure.

3

R ELATED W ORK

Jeong et al. [20] presented a one-time password based user authentication scheme using smart card for smart home networks. Their
scheme is lightweight as it uses one-way hash function operations.
Their scheme does not provide mutual authentication between
GW N and smart device as well as between user and smart device.
Their scheme does not provide traceability, and user anonymity
properties as the user identity is sent in plaintext and also the
messages can be easily traced by an adversary. Furthermore, their
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scheme is insecure against stolen smart card attack and privilegedinsider attack as the adversary can derive secret credentials of a
user from the extracted information stored in the smart card. In
addition, their scheme is not resilient against smart device physical
capture attack.
Vaidya et al. [21] proposed a password based remote user
authentication scheme for digital home network. Their scheme is
also based upon lightweight computation modules such as hashed
one-time password and hash-chaining methods. Similar to Jeong
et al. [20], their scheme does not provide mutual authentication
between GW N and smart device as well as between user and
smart device. Kim and Kim [22] analyzed Vaidya et al.’s scheme
[21] and identified that it is vulnerable to password guessing
attack and does not provide forward secrecy with lost smart card.
They also proposed a new scheme which withstands the security
weaknesses observed in Vaidya et al.’s scheme [21]. Vaidya et
al.’s scheme [21] scheme is insecure against stolen smart card
attack and privileged-insider attack as the adversary can derive
secret credentials of a user from the extracted information stored
in the smart card. In addition, their scheme is not resilient against
smart device physical capture attack. Later, Vaidya et al. [23]
also proposed an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based device
authentication technique for smart energy home area network
which requires more overheads as compared to the scheme in
[21]. Kim-Kim’s scheme [22] is however not resilient against
privileged-insider attack, user impersonation attack and password
guessing attack. In addition, Kim-Kim’s scheme [22] also fails to
preserve traceability and anonymity of user and smart device.
Hanumanthappa et al. [24] proposed a secure three-way
authentication mechanism for user authentication and privacy
preservation. In their mechanism, the users or service providers
can check whether the device is compromised or not by the help
of their proposed encrypted pass-phrases mechanism.
Santoso and Vun [25] proposed ECC based user authentication
scheme for a smart home system. In their scheme, the mobile
user can authenticate with the devices deployed in the smart
home using a central node, called the home gateway. Similar to
the schemes of Jeong et al. [20], Vaidya et al. [21], and Kim
and Kim [22], their scheme does not provide traceability, and
user anonymity properties. Furthermore, their scheme is insecure
against stolen smart card attack and privileged-insider attack. In
addition, their scheme is not resilient against smart device physical
capture attack.
Chang and Le [26] recently proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), which
uses a user’s password and smart card. Their scheme has two
protocols: P1 and P2 . While P1 is based on bitwise XOR and
hash functions, P2 uses ECC along with bitwise XOR and hash
functions. However, Das et al. [27] proved that both P1 and P2
are insecure against session specific temporary information attack
and offline password guessing attack, while P1 is also insecure
against session key breach attack. Moreover, they pointed out that
both P1 and P2 are inefficient in authentication and password
change phases. To erase the security limitations in P1 and P2 ,
a new authentication and key agreement scheme using ECC in
WSNs is presented [27].
Kumar et al. [5] presented a lightweight and secure session
key establishment scheme for smart home network. To establish
the mutual trust, each smart device control unit establishes a
session key with the GW N by using a short authentication token.
However, their scheme does not preserve the GW N anonymity

4

and also the traceability properties. In addition, their scheme does
not provide mutual authentication between user and smart device
as well as between user and the GW N .
Li et al. [28] proposed an ECC based key establishment
scheme for smart home energy management systems. Through the
implementation, it is shown that their scheme is efficient with
respect to execution time and memory usage. Han et al. [29]
presented a secure key agreement scheme for ubiquitous smart
home systems, which is particularly applicable to the consumer
electronics devices in a smart home. The security and functionality
features of the existing schemes summarized in Table 4 are also
discussed in detail in Section 7.
TABLE 1
Notations used
Notation
RA
GW N
SDj
Ui
SPi
IDi
IDSDj
P Wi , BIOi
Ti
∆T
KGW N −Ui
KGW N −SDj
EK (·)/DK (·)
σi
τi
t
Gen
Rep
h(·)
||, ⊕

4

Description
Registration authority
Gateway node
j th smart device in the home
ith user
Ui ’s smart phone
Ui ’s identity
SDj ’s identity
Ui ’s password & personal biometrics, respectively
Current timestamp
Maximum transmission delay
Secret key of GW N for Ui
Secret key of GW N for SDj
Symmetric encryption/decryption (for example,
AES-CBC (128 bits) [12]) using key K
Biometric secret key of Ui
Public reproduction parameter of Ui
Error tolerance threshold used in fuzzy extractor
Fuzzy extractor probabilistic generation procedure
Fuzzy extractor deterministic reproduction procedure
One-way collision-resistant cryptographic hash function
Concatenation and bitwise XOR operations, respectively

T HE P ROPOSED S CHEME

We propose a new user authenticated key establishment scheme
for the smart home environment. In the proposed scheme, we have
a registration authority, several smart sensing devices, a gateway
node (GW N ) and several users, who want to access the smart
devices. First of all, the secure offline registration of each smart
device and GW N is done at the registration authority (RA).
Then a user, who wants to access the smart devices, needs to
register at the registration authority providing his/her necessary
information. Each user has a smart phone, which is capable
to read the credential information such as the user’s identity,
password and biometric (fingerprint scanning etc.) provided by
that user. The GW N acts as an intermediary node. The legal
user’s authentication request goes to the GW N and then the
GW N forwards the request to the requested smart device. The
smart device sends response to the GW N accordingly and then
the GW N forwards the response to the user. As discussed in
the threat model provided in Section 1.3, the GW N is fully
trusted and all the sensitive informations stored in the GW N
are protected from an adversary [5]. Moreover, we assume that
all the heterogeneous devices (i.e., GW N , users (smart phones)
and smart devices) are synchronized with their clocks, and agree
(mutually) on a maximum transmission delay (∆T ) to protect
replay attacks in the proposed scheme [5].
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Our scheme has six phases: 1) offline smart device and gateway registration, 2) user registration, 3) login, 4) authentication
and agreement, 5) biometric and password update, and 6) dynamic
smart device addition. The notations presented in Table 1 are
used in the proposed scheme. We assume that there are m users
and n smart devices in the smart home environment. In addition,
we assume that n′ additional smart devices can be added in the
network through the dynamic smart device addition phase, where
n′ << n. We also use the fuzzy extractor to verify the biometrics.
The fuzzy extractor is a tuple hM, l, ti, which is composed of the
following two algorithms [30], [31]:
Gen: It is a probabilistic algorithm, which takes a biometric
template Bi from a given metric space M as input, and then
outputs a biometric key σi ∈ {0, 1}l and a public reproduction
parameter τi , that is, Gen(Bi ) = {σi , τi }, where l denotes the
number of bits present in σi .
Rep: This is a deterministic algorithm, which takes a noisy
biometric template Bi′ ∈ M and a public parameter τi and t
related to Bi , and then it reproduces (recovers) the biometric key
σi . In other words, Rep(Bi′ , τi ) = σi provided that the Hamming
distance between Bi and Bi′ is less than or equal to a predefined
error tolerance threshold value t.
4.1 Offline Smart Device and Gateway Registration
Phase
The offline smart device (SDj ) and GW N registration is done by
the registration authority (RA) in offline securely (for example,
in person). For each SDj (j = 1, 2, . . . , n), the RA selects a
unique identity IDSDj and also generates a unique random 1024bit secret key KGW N −SDj of GW N for SDj , and computes the
corresponding temporal credential h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ), and
stores {IDSDj , h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )} into the memory of
SDj . The RA further randomly generates the unique GW N ’s
identity IDGW N and a unique random 1024-bit secret key
KGW N −Ui of GW N for each user Ui (i = 1, 2, . . . , m), and
also selects the temporary identity T IDi corresponding to each
user Ui ’s identity IDi into the memory of the GW N after Ui ’s
successful registration phase described in Section 4.2. Finally,
the GW N and SDj contain the information h{(T IDi , IDi ,
KGW N −Ui )|i = 1, 2, . . . , m}, {(IDSDj , KGW N −SDj )|j =
1, 2, . . . , n}i, and hIDSDj , h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )i for each
user Ui and smart device SDj , respectively.
4.2

User Registration Phase

To access the services from a particular smart device SDj , a user
Ui first needs to register with the RA securely (for example, in
person). The following steps are required for the Ui ’s registration,
which are also summarized in Fig. 2:
Step REG1. Ui chooses a unique identity IDi and a password
P Wi , and generates 160-bit random secrets a and r. Ui also
imprints his/her biometrics BIOi to the sensor of SPi . The
SPi applies the fuzzy extractor probabilistic generation function
Gen(·) to generate secret biometric key σi and public parameter
τi as Gen(BIOi ) = (σi , τi ) [31], [32], [33]. The SPi of Ui
calculates the masked password RP Wi = h(P Wi ||σi ||a) ⊕ r,
and sends the registration request hIDi , RP Wi i to the RA
using a secure channel. Note that a privileged-insider user of
the RA being an adversary knows the registration information
{IDi , RP Wi } to mount the privileged-insider attack.
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Step REG2. After receiving hIDi , RP Wi i from SPi , the RA
first generates a 1024-bit secret key KGW N −Ui of GW N for
Ui , and calculates Ai = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕RP Wi . RA also
generates a temporary identity T IDi corresponding to IDi for Ui
as discussed in the GW N registration phase (Section 4.1). Finally,
RA sends the registration reply with information {Ai , T IDi } to
Ui securely. Note that the privileged-insider user of the RA being
an adversary does not know the information {Ai , T IDi } as these
information are computed online by the RA.
Step REG3. After receiving hAi , T IDi i from the RA, SPi
of Ui computes parameters Bi = h(IDi ||σi ) ⊕a, RP Wi′ =
RP Wi ⊕ r = h(P Wi ||σi ||a), Ci = h(IDi ||RP Wi′ ||σi )
and A∗i = Ai ⊕ r = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕RP Wi′ = h(IDi
||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕h(P Wi ||σi ||a). Finally, SPi stores the information hT IDi , A∗i , Bi , Ci , τi , h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), ti in its
memory, where t is the error tolerance parameter used by the fuzzy
extractor Rep(·) function.
At the end of this phase, the user Ui erases Ai from his/her
smart phone SPi in order to avoid the privileged-insider attack as
explained in Section 5.3.3. In addition, the RA also deletes Ai
and RP Wi from its database.
User (Ui )/ Smart phone (SPi )
Choose IDi , P Wi , and imprint BIOi .
Generate 160-bit random secrets a, r.
Compute Gen(BIOi ) = (σi , τi ),
RP Wi = h(P Wi ||σi ||a) ⊕ r.
hIDi , RP Wi i
−−−−−−−−−→
(via a secure channel)
Compute Bi = h(IDi ||σi ) ⊕ a,
RP Wi′ = RP Wi ⊕ r = h(P Wi ||σi ||a),
Ci = h(IDi ||RP Wi′ ||σi ), A∗i = Ai ⊕ r
= h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕ RP Wi′ .
Delete Ai from SPj ’s memory.
Store {T IDi , A∗i , Bi , Ci , τi , h(·),
Gen(·), Rep(·), t} in SPj ’s memory.

Registration authority (RA)
Select 1024-bit KGW N −Ui .
Compute
Ai = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕ RP Wi .
Generate temporary identity T IDi
corresponding to IDi .
hAi , T IDi i
←−−−−−−−
(via a secure channel)

Store {IDi , T IDi } in GW N ’s database.
Delete Ai and RP Wi from its database.

Fig. 2. User registration phase

4.3 Login Phase
The login process of Ui is performed as per the following steps:
Step UL1. Ui first provides his/her identity IDi and password
P Wi∗ into the interface of the smart phone SPi , and also provides
his/her biometrics BIOi∗ to the sensor of SPi . SPi extracts the
biometric key σi∗ as σi∗ = Rep(BIOi∗ , τi ) with the constraint
that the Hamming distance between the original biometrics BIOi
at the time of registration and entered current BIOi∗ is less than
or equal to t. SPi further computes a∗ = Bi ⊕ h(IDi ||σi∗ ),
RP Wi∗ = h(P Wi∗ || σi∗ ||a∗ ) and Ci∗ = h(IDi ||RP Wi∗ ||σi∗ ).
SPi then checks whether Ci∗ = Ci . If it is valid, Ui passes both
password and biometric verification. Otherwise, the session is
terminated immediately.
Step UL2. SPi calculates M1 = A∗i ⊕ RP Wi∗ = h(IDi
||KGW N −Ui ). Then SPi generates a random nonce rUi and the
current timestamp T1 , and calculates parameters M2 = M1 ⊕ rUi
and M3 = h(M2 ||T1 || IDi ||T IDi || rUi ). Finally, SPi sends
the login request message hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i to GW N via an
open channel.
4.4 Authentication and Key agreement Phase
On receiving the login request hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i from SPi ,
following steps are performed by Ui /SPi , GW N and an accessed
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User (Ui )/Smart phone (SPi )
hT IDi , A∗i , Bi , Ci , τi ,
h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), ti
Input IDi , P Wi∗ & BIOi∗ .
Compute σi∗ = Rep(BIOi∗ , τi ),
a∗ = Bi ⊕ h(IDi ||σi∗ ),
RP Wi∗ = h(P Wi∗ ||σi∗ ||a∗ ),
Ci∗ = h(IDi ||RP Wi∗ ||σi∗ ).
Check if Ci∗ = Ci ? If so, compute
M1 = A∗i ⊕ RP Wi∗ = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ).
Generate rUi & T1 , and calculate
M2 = M1 ⊕ rUi ,
M3 = h(M2 ||T1 ||IDi ||T IDi ||rUi ).
hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via open channel)

Check if |T4 − T4∗ | ≤ ∆T ?
If so, decrypt
∗
∗
∗
DM1 [M14 ] = (rU
, rGW
N , rSDj ,
i
IDSDj , IDGW N , h(M6 )).
∗
= rUi ?
Check if rU
i
′
= h[IDi ||IDSDj
If so, compute SKij
∗
∗
||IDGW N ||rUi ||rGW
N ||rSDj
||h(M1 )||h(M6 )],
′
||T3 )||T4 ||rUi ).
M17 = h(h(SKij
Check if M17 = M16 ? If so, Ui and SDj
′
(= SKij ).
establish session key SKij
Compute T IDinew = M15 ⊕ h(T IDi
||M1 ||T3 ||T4 ).
Replace T IDi with T IDinew .

6

Gateway node (GW N )
h{(T IDi , IDi , KGW N −Ui )|i = 1, 2, . . . , m},
{(IDSDj , KGW N −SDj )|j = 1, 2, . . . , n}i
Check if |T1 − T1∗ | ≤ ∆T ?
If so, extract IDi and KGW N −Ui
corresponding to T IDi . Compute
M4 = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui )(= M1 ) using
∗
extracted IDi & KGW N −Ui , rU
= M2 ⊕ M4 ,
i
∗
M5 = h(M2 ||T1 ||IDi ||T IDi ||rU
).
i
Check if M5 = M3 ?
If matches, generate rGW N & T2 .
Compute M6 = h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ),
∗
M7 = EM6 [IDi , IDGW N , rU
, rGW N , h(M4 )],
i
M8 = h(M6 ||T2 ||IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rGW N ).

hM7 , M8 , T2 i
−−−−−−−−−→
(via open channel)

Smart device (SDj )
hIDSDj , h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )i
Check if |T2 − T2∗ | ≤ ∆T ?
If so, decrypt M7 to retrieve
∗
(IDi , IDGW N , rU
, rGW N , h(M4 ))
i
= Dh(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) [M7 ].
Compute M9 = h[h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )
||T2 ||IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rGW N ].
Check if M9 = M8 ?
If so, generate rSDj & T3 , and
compute SKij = h[IDi ||IDSDj ||
∗
||rGW N ||rSDj ||h(M4 )
IDGW N ||rU
i
||h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ))],

M10 = h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )||T3 ) ⊕rSDj ,

Check if |T3 − T3∗ | ≤ ∆T ?
∗
= M10 ⊕
If so, compute rSD
j
h[h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )||T3 ],
∗
M13 = h(rSD
||rGW N ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||T3 ).
j
Check if M13 = M12 ?
∗
∗
, rGW N , rSD
,
If so, compute M14 = EM4 [rU
i
j
IDSDj , IDGW N , h(M6 )].
new
Generate T4 , select T IDi
and compute
M15 = T IDinew ⊕ h(T IDi ||M4 ||T3 ||T4 ),
∗
M16 = h(M11 ||T4 ||rU
).
i
hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(via open channel)

M11 = h(SKij ||T3 ),
M12 = h(rSDj ||rGW N ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||T3 ).
hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(via open channel)

Fig. 3. Summary of login, and authentication and key agreement phases

smart device SDj to establish a session key between Ui and SDj
for later secure communication:
Step AUKA1. GW N first checks the timeliness of T1 by
condition |T1 − T1∗ | ≤ ∆T , where the maximum transmission
delay is denoted by ∆T and T1∗ is the reception time of the
message hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i. If the condition matches, the
GW N searches the received T IDi in its database and if it is
found in the database, the GW N extracts IDi and KGW N −Ui
corresponding to T IDi from its database, and calculates M4 =
h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) (= M1 ) using the extracted IDi and
∗
= M2 ⊕ M4 = M2 ⊕M1 , M5 = h(M2 ||T1 ||
KGW N −Ui , rU
i
∗
IDi || T IDi || rU
).
i
Step AUKA2. GW N checks if M5 = M3 holds. If it does
not match, it terminates the authentication process. Otherwise
GW N generates a random nonce rGW N and timestamp T2 , and
calculates parameters M6 = h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ), M7 =
∗
EM6 [IDi , IDGW N , rU
, rGW N , h(M4 )], M8 = h(M6 || T2 ||
i
IDi || IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rGW N ). For computing M7 , if we use
the stateless CBC of AES-128 (AES-CBC) symmetric encryption
scheme, then the GW N needs to set the IV of CBC as IV =
h(M6 ||T1 ) so that it is random for each message in a particular
session. Then GW N sends the authentication request message
hM7 , M8 , T2 i to SDj via an open channel.
Step AUKA3. After receiving the message hM7 , M8 , T2 i
from GW N , SDj checks the timeliness of T2 by the criteria
|T2 − T2∗ | ≤ ∆T , where T2∗ is the reception time of the message
hM7 , M8 , T2 i. If condition holds, SDj decrypts M7 using the
∗
,
stored key h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) as (IDi , IDGW N , rU
i
rGW N , h(M4 )) = Dh(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) [M7 ]. For decrypting M7 , SDj also needs to set the IV of CBC as IV =

h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )||T1 ) (= h(M6 ||T1 )).
Step AUKA4. SDj calculates M9 = h[h(IDSDj ||
KGW N −SDj ) ||T2 ||IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rGW N ] and
checks the condition M9 = M8 . If it does not match, it terminates the authentication process. Otherwise, SDj generates a
random nonce rSDj and the current timestamp T3 , and computes the session key as SKij = h[IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N
∗
||rU
||rGW N || rSDj ||h(M4 )|| h(h(IDSDj || KGW N −SDj ))].
i
After that, SDj computes parameters M10 = h(h(IDSDj
||KGW N −SDj ) ||T3 )⊕ rSDj , M11 = h(SKij ||T3 ) and M12 =
h(rSDj ||rGW N ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||T3 ). Then SDj sends the
authentication reply message hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i to the GW N
via an insecure channel.
Step AUKA5. Upon receiving authentication request message,
GW N checks the timeliness of T3 by applying the criteria
|T3 − T3∗ | ≤ ∆T , where T3∗ is the reception time of the message
hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i. If condition matches, GW N computes
∗
rSD
= M10 ⊕ h[h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) ||T3 ] and M13 =
j
∗
h(rSD
||rGW N ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||T3 ). The GW N checks
j
the condition M13 = M12 . If it does not match, the GW N aborts
the message. Otherwise, GW N computes M14 using previously
∗
computed M4 = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) as M14 = EM4 [rU
,
i
∗
,
ID
,
h(M
)]
.
For
encrypting
the
rGW N , rSD
,
ID
GW N
6
SDj
j
information in M14 using the key M4 , we also use the stateless
CBC of AES-128 (AES-CBC) symmetric encryption scheme and
thus, the GW N needs to set the IV of CBC as IV = h(M4 ||T4 )
so that it is random for each message in a particular session.
The GW N chooses current timestamp T4 and generates a new
temporary identity T IDinew corresponding to IDi . The GW N
further computes M15 = T IDinew ⊕h(T IDi ||M4 ||T3 ||T4 )
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∗
and M16 = h(M11 ||T4 ||rU
). The GW N sends the message
i
hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i to Ui via insecure channel.
Step AUKA6. After receiving the message hM14 , M15 , M16 ,
T3 , T4 i, SPi of Ui first checks the timeliness of T4 with the
condition |T4 − T4∗ | ≤ ∆T , where T4∗ is the reception time of
the message. If condition matches, Ui decrypts M14 using pre∗
∗
∗
computed M1 as DM1 [M14 ] = (rU
, rGW
N , rSDj , IDSDj ,
i
IDGW N , h(M6 )). For decrypting M14 , SDj also needs to set
the IV of CBC as IV = h(M1 ||T4 ) (= h(M4 ||T4 )).
∗
Then SPi checks if rU
= rUi . If they do not match, SPi
i
terminates the authentication process. Otherwise, it computes the
′
∗
session key SKij
= h[IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rUi ||rGW
N
∗
′
||rSDj ||h(M1 ) ||h(M6 )] and M17 = h(h(SKij ||T3 ) ||T4
||rUi ), and then matches if M17 = M16 . If it does not match,
SPi terminates the session and discards the computed session
key. Otherwise, message comes from the valid source and the
′
computed session key SKij
is authentic. Finally, SPi computes
the new temporary identity as T IDinew = M15 ⊕ h(T IDi ||M1
||T3 ||T4 ) and replaces T IDi with T IDinew in its memory.
The login, and authentication and agreement phases are summarized in Fig. 3.

4.5

Password and Biometric Update Phase

The proposed scheme provides password and biometric update
facility through which a legitimate user Ui can update his/her
password and biometrics for security reasons at any time after
user registration phase without further involving the RA. Note
that the biometric information of a given user Ui is unique and
unchanged as compared to the chosen password by that user Ui .
However, we suggest the user Ui to update his/her biometric
information in the proposed scheme, if he/she desires to do so.
This is required to protect strongly the offline password guessing
attack to be considered in this phase as described by Huang et al.
[34], which is discussed in detail in Section 5.3.11. This phase
needs the following steps:
Step PBU1. Ui provides his/her identity IDi , old password
P Wiold to interface of the SPi and current his/her biometrics
BIOiold to the sensor of the SPi . SPi then computes σiold =
Rep(BIOiold , τi ), a′ = Bi ⊕ h(IDi ||σiold ), RP Wiold =
h(P Wiold ||σiold ||a′ ) and Ciold = h(IDi || RP Wiold ||σiold ).
SPi checks the condition Ciold = Ci . If it matches, Ui is the
actual user; otherwise, the phase is terminated immediately.
Step PBU2. SPi asks Ui to enter a new password P Winew and
also imprint new biometrics BIOinew . The SPi then calculates
Gen(BIOinew ) = (σinew , τinew ), RP Winew = h(P Winew
||σinew ||a′ ), Binew = h(IDi ||σinew ) ⊕a′ , Cinew = h(IDi
||RP Winew ||σinew ) and Anew
= A∗i ⊕ RP Wiold ⊕RP Winew ,
i
= h(IDi || KGW N −Ui ) ⊕RP Winew = h(IDi || KGW N −Ui )
⊕h(P Winew ||σinew ||a′ ).
Step PBU3. Finally, SPi replaces τi , A∗i , Bi , and Ci with
new
τi , Anew
, Binew , and Cinew in its memory, respectively.
i
The password and biometric update phase is also summarized
in Fig. 4.
4.6

Dynamic Smart Device Addition Phase

To deploy a new smart device SDjnew in the existing smart home
network, the RA performs the following steps in offline:
new
Step DA1. RA first assigns a unique new identity IDSD
and
j
new
also generates a new secret key KGW N −SDj
of GW N for
SDjnew . RA further computes the temporal credential of SDjnew

7

User (Ui )
Provide IDi , P Wiold
& BIOiold .

Provide
P Winew & BIOinew .

Smart phone (SPi )
hT IDi , A∗i , Bi , Ci , τi , h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), ti
Compute σiold = Rep(BIOiold , τi ),
a′ = Bi ⊕ h(IDi ||σiold ),
RP Wiold = h(P Wiold ||σiold ||a′ ),
Ciold = h(IDi ||RP Wiold ||σiold ).
Check if Ciold = Ci ?
If so, ask Ui to provide new
password & biometrics.
Compute Gen(BIOinew ) = (σinew , τinew ),
RP Winew = h(P Winew ||σinew ||a′ ),
Binew = h(IDi ||σinew ) ⊕ a′ ,
Cinew = h(IDi ||RP Winew ||σinew ),
Anew
= A∗i ⊕ RP Wiold ⊕ RP Winew ,
i
= h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕ RP Winew .
Finally, SPi replaces τi , A∗i , Bi and Ci with
, Binew and Cinew , respectively.
τinew , Anew
i

Fig. 4. Summary of password and biometric update phase

as h(IDSDjnew ||KGW N −SDjnew ).
Step DA2. RA stores the information {IDSDjnew ,
h(IDSDjnew ||KGW N −SDjnew )} into the memory of SDj before
its deployment in the smart home. RA also sends the information
{IDSDjnew , KGW N −SDjnew } to the GW N securely, which are
then stored in the database of the GW N .
Finally, RA also needs to inform the existing users in the
network about the deployment of new smart device SDjnew so
that they can access the services from SDjnew , if needed.

5

S ECURITY A NALYSIS

In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme
using both formal and informal analysis.
5.1 Formal Security Analysis using Real-Or-Random
Model
The widely-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model [14] is used
for formal security analysis of the proposed scheme.
5.1.1 ROR Model
We follow the Abdalla et al.’s ROR model [14] for formal security
analysis as done in [26]. According to our scheme, we have three
participants in the smart home: smart device SDj , user Ui and
GW N .
Participants. Let ΠtSDj , ΠuUi and ΠvGW N be the instances t,
u and v of SDj , Ui and GW N , respectively. These are called
oracles [26].
Accepted state. An instance Πt is known to be accepted, if
upon receiving the last expected protocol message, it goes into an
accept state. The ordered concatenation of all communicated (sent
and received) messages by Πt forms the session identification
(sid) of Πt for the current session.
Partnering. Two instances Πt1 and Πt2 are said to be partnered if the following three conditions are fulfilled simultaneously:
1) both Πt1 and Πt2 are in accept state; 2) both Πt1 and Πt2
mutually authenticate each other and share the same sid; and 3)
Πt1 and Πt2 are mutual partners of each other.
Freshness. The instance ΠuUi or ΠtSDj is fresh, if the session
key SKij between Ui and SDj has not revealed to an adversary
A using the Reveal(Πt ) query given below [26].
Adversary. It is assumed that A has fully control over all the
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communications in a smart home. A has the ability to read, modify
the exchanged messages, or can fabricate new messages and inject
them into the network. Furthermore, A has access to the following
queries [26]:
Execute(Πu , Πv , Πt ): A can execute this query to obtain
the messages exchanged between three legitimate participants Ui ,
GW N and SDj , which is further modeled as an eavesdropping
attack.
Reveal(Πt ): This query reveals the current session key SKij
generated by Πt (and its partner) to an adversary A.
Send(Πt , msg): A runs this query to send a message, say
msg , to a participant instance Πt , and also receives a response
message. It is modeled as an active attack.
CorruptSmartP hone(ΠuUi ): It represents the smart phone
SPi lost/stolen attack, which outputs the information stored in
SPi .
CorruptSmartDevice(ΠtSDj ): This represents an attack
in which secret h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) is disclosed to A,
which is applied to verify the security of the proposed
scheme. As mentioned in [26], both CorruptSmartP hone
and CorruptSmartDevice queries ensure the weak-corruption
model in which temporary keys and the internal data of the
participant instances are not corrupted.
T est(Πt ): It represents the semantic security of a session key
SKij between Ui and SDj following the indistinguishability in
the ROR model [14]. An unbiased coin b is flipped before start of
the experiment, and its result is only known to A which is used to
decide the output of the T est query. If A runs this query, and the
established session key SKij is also new, then Πt returns SKij
in case b = 1 or a random number for b = 0; otherwise, it outputs
⊥ (null).
Note that we impose a restriction that the adversary A has
access to only limited number of CorruptSmartP hone(ΠuUi )
and CorruptSmartDevice(ΠtSDj ) queries, whereas he/she can
access the T est(Πt ) query many times. According to the threat
model described in Section 1.3, the GW N is trusted. Thus, A
does not have any access to a corrupt query related to the GW N .
Semantic security of session key. According to the requirements of the ROR model [14], A needs to distinguish between an
instance’s real session key and a random key. A can make several
T est queries to either ΠtSDj or ΠuUi . The output of T est query
should be consistent with respect to the random bit b. After the experiment is finished, A returns a guessed bit b′ and he/she can win
the game if the condition b′ = b is met. Let SU CC be an event
AKE
that A win the game. The advantage AdvP
of A in breaking
the semantic security of our authenticated key agreement (AKE)
scheme, say P against deriving the session key SKij between Ui
AKE
and SDj is given by AdvP
= |2.P r[SU CC] − 1|. In the
AKE
ROR sense, P is secure if AdvP
≤ ψ , where ψ > 0 is a
sufficiently small real number.
Random oracle. As mentioned in [26], all communicating
participants as well as A have access to a collision-resistant
one-way cryptographic hash function h(·). h(·) is modeled by
a random oracle, say HO.
5.1.2 Security Proof
Theorem 1 provides the semantic security of our proposed scheme
under the widely-accepted ROR model [26], [35].
Theorem 1. Let A be an adversary running in polynomial time
t against our scheme P in the random oracle, D a uniformly
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distributed password dictionary and l the number of bits present
in the biometrics key σi . The advantage of A in breaking semantic
2
qh
AKE
security of our scheme is estimated as AdvP
≤ |Hash|
+
qsend
IN D−CP A
+
2Adv
(k)
,
where
q
,
q
,
|Hash|
,
|D|
h
send
Ω
2l−1 .|D|

IN D−CP A
IN D−CP A
and AdvΩ,SE
(k) or AdvΩ,M
(k) are the number of
E
HO queries, the Send queries, the range space of h(·), the size
of D, and the advantage of A in breaking the IND-CPA secure
symmetric cipher Ω (provided in Definition 2), respectively, and
IN D−CP A
IN D−CP A
IN D−CP A
AdvΩ
(k) = AdvΩ,SE
(k) or AdvΩ,M
(k).
E

Proof. The proof is similar to that presented in the schemes [26],
[35]. The sequence of five games, say GMi , are defined in the
security analysis, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Assume that SU CCi be
an event wherein an adversary A can guess the random bit b in
GMi correctly.
GM0 : This game corresponds to a real attack performed by A
against our scheme P in the ROR sense. The bit b is chosen at the
beginning of GM0 . Hence, it follows that
AKE
AdvP
= |2.P r[SU CC0 ] − 1|.

(1)

GM1 : This game represents an eavesdropping attack performed by the single/multiple eavesdropper SE/M E , say A,
where A can query Execute(Πu , Πv , Πt ) oracle. At the end
of the game, A makes queries to the T est oracle. The output of
T est oracle determines whether it is the actual session key SKij
or a random number. Note that the session key SKij is calculated
by both Ui and SDj as SKij = h[IDi || IDSDj ||IDGW N
∗
||rU
||rGW N ||rSDj ||h(M4 ) ||h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ))],
i
where M4 = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ). To calculate SKij , A must
have M4 and h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ), which further involve
secret keys KGW N −Ui and KGW N −SDj . A also requires IDi ,
IDSDj , IDGW N , rUi , rGW N and rSDj for calculating SKij ,
which are unknown to him/her. As a consequence, the chance of
winning the game GM1 for A is not increased by eavesdropping
attack. It is then obvious that
P r[SU CC0 ] = P r[SU CC1 ].

(2)

GM2 : By adding the simulations of the Send and HO oracles
are added into GM1 , GM1 is transformed into GM2 , which
represents an active attack. In this game, the objective of A is
to fool a participant to accept a modified message. A is permitted
to make different HO queries to examine the existence of the
hash collisions. All the exchanged messages hT IDi , M2 , M3 ,
T1 i, hM7 , M8 , T2 i, hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i and hM14 , M15 ,
M16 , T3 , T4 i during the login and authentication phase contain
the participant’s identity, random nonce and timestamps. Hence,
there is no collision when the Send oracle is queried by A. The
results of the birthday paradox give
|P r[SU CC1 ] − P r[SU CC2 ]| ≤ qh2 /(2|Hash|).

(3)

GM3 : GM2 is transformed into GM3 by adding the simulation of CorruptSmartP hone oracle. A can choose lowentropy passwords, and using the information stored into SPi
he/she may try to acquire the user’s password using the dictionary
attack. Again, A may try to acquire the biometrics key σi from
the information stored in SPi . We have used a strong fuzzy
extractor in our scheme P , which is capable to extract at most
l random bits and the guessing probability of σi ∈ {0, 1}l by A
is approximately 21l [31]. It is also assumed that the system allows
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the limited number of wrong password inputs. Thus, we have the
following result,

|P r[SU CC2 ] − P r[SU CC3 ]| ≤ qsend /(2l .|D|).

(4)

GM4 : GM3 is transformed into GM4 , where GM4 is the
last game. It models an attack in which A can physically capture
(compromise) a smart device SDj by adding the simulation of
CorruptSmartDevice oracle. A then knows the information
{IDSDj , h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )} which is stored in SDj .
Let A also has all the eavesdropped messages hT IDi , M2 ,
M3 , T1 i, hM7 , M8 , T2 i, hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i and hM14 ,
M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i. Then, A tries to retrieve the information
{IDi , IDGW N , rUi , rGW N , h(M4 )} by decrypting M7 us∗
ing h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj )} as (IDi , IDGW N , rU
, rGW N ,
i
h(M4 )) = Dh(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) [M7 ]. However, A can not
decrypt M14 as M4 is unknown to him/her since as M14 = EM4
∗
∗
[rU
, rGW N , rSD
, IDSDj , IDGW N , h(M6 )]. This implies that
i
j
without having M4 = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) (= M1 ), it is quite
∗
∗
, rGW N , rSD
,
difficult task for A to extract the information {rU
i
j
IDSDj , IDGW N , h(M6 )}. Thus, computation of the session
key SKij = h[IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rUi ||rGW N ||rSDj
′
) is difficult as A needs the necessary
||h(M1 ) ||h(M6 )] (= SKij
information including rSDj and M1 (= M4 ) due to the INDCPA secure symmetric cipher used in the proposed scheme for
encryption/decryption. This concludes that
IN D−CP A
(k).
|P r[SU CC3 ] − P r[SU CC4 ]| ≤ AdvΩ

≤ qh2 /(2.|Hash|) + qsend /(2l .|D|)
IN D−CP A
+AdvΩ
(k).
(6)

Finally, Equation (6) yields the required result:
AKE
AdvP
≤

5.2

Fig. 5. The user Ui ’s role in HLPSL

(5)

In GM4 , all the random oracles are simulated. A is only left to
guess the bit b for winning the game after querying the T est
oracle. It is clear that P r[SU CC4 ] = 1/2.
AKE
= |P r[SU CC0 ]− 12 |.
From Equation (1), we get, 21 .AdvP
Using the triangular inequality, we have, |P r[SU CC1 ]
−P r[SU CC4 ]| ≤
|P r[SU CC1 ] − P r[SU CC2 ]| +
|P r[SU CC2 ] − P r[SU CC4 ]| ≤ |P r[SU CC1 ] − P r[SU CC2 ]|
+|P r[SU CC2 ]
−P r[SU CC3 ]|
+|P r[SU CC3 ] −
2
qh
qsend
ECDDHP
(t).
P r[SU CC4 ]| ≤ 2.|Hash| + 2l .|D| +AdvGq
Using Equations (2) – (5), we have,

|P r[SU CC0 ] − 1/2|

role user (Ui, RA, GWN, SDj: agent, H : hash_func,
SKuira : symmetric_key, Snd, Rcv: channel(dy))
played_by Ui
def=
local State: nat, IDi, IDsdj, IDgwn, PWi, BIOi, RPWi, A: text,
R, Kgwnui, Kgwnsdj, Rgwn, Rsdj, T1, M1, Rui, TIDi,TIDinew: text,
M2, M3, T3, T4, Sigmai: text, Gen, Rep : hash_func
const ui_gwn_t1, ui_gwn_rui, gwn_ui_t4, gwn_ui_tidinew,sr1,sr2: protocol_id
init State := 0
transition
1. State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) =|>
% Registration phase
State’ := 1 /\ A’ := new() /\ R’ := new()
/\ secret({PWi, BIOi, A’, R’}, sr1, Ui)
/\ Sigmai’ := Gen(BIOi) /\ RPWi’ := xor(H(PWi.Sigmai’.A’), R’)
% Send registration request securely to RA
/\ Snd({IDi.RPWi’}_SKuira)
% Receive information securely from RA for SPi
2. State = 1/\Rcv({xor(H(IDi.Kgwnui),xor(H(PWi.Sigmai’.A’),R’)).TIDi’}_SKuira)=|>
% Login phase
State’ := 2 /\ secret({Kgwnui,Kgwnsdj}, sr2, GWN)
% Send login request to GWN via public channel
/\ Rui’ := new() /\ T1’ := new()/\ M1’ := H(IDi.Kgwnui)
/\ M2’ := xor(M1’, Rui’) /\ M3’ := H(M2’.T1’.IDi’.TIDi’.Rui’)
/\ Snd(TIDi’.M2’.M3’.T1’)
% Ui has freshly generated the values T1 and Rui for GWN
/\ witness(Ui,GWN,ui_gwn_t1, T1’)/\witness(Ui,GWN,ui_gwn_rui,Rui’)
% Authentication and key agreement phase
% Receive authentication reply from GWN via public channel
3. State = 2 /\ Rcv({Rui’.Rgwn’.Rsdj’.IDi.IDsdj.IDgwn.
H(H(IDsdj.Kgwnsdj))}_H(IDi.Kgwnui).
xor(TIDinew’, H(TIDi’.H(IDi.Kgwnui).T3’.T4’)).
H(H(H(IDi.IDsdj.IDgwn.Rui’.Rgwn’.Rsdj’.
H(H(IDi.Kgwnui)).H(H(IDsdj.Kgwnsdj))).T3’).T4’.Rui’).T3’.T4’)=|>
% Ui’s acceptance of T4 and TIDinew generated for Ui by GWN
State’ := 3/\request(GWN,Ui,gwn_ui_t4,T4’)/\request(GWN,Ui,gwn_ui_tidinew,TIDinew’)
end role

qsend
qh2
IN D−CP A
+
+ 2AdvΩ
(k).
|Hash| 2l−1 .|D|

Formal Security Verification using AVISPA

The proposed scheme is simulated for the formal security verification using the broadly-accepted Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool to exhibit that
the proposed scheme withstands replay and man-in-the-middle
attacks.
AVISPA integrates four back ends that implement different
state-of-the-art automatic analysis mechanisms: (i) OFMC; (ii)
CL-AtSe; (iii) SATMC; and (iv) TA4SP. The detailed description
and functionality of these back ends are available in [15], [35],
[36], [37], [38]. A security protocol requires to be implemented
in the High Level Protocols Specification Language (HLPSL)
[39], which is converted into intermediate format (IF) using the

HLPSL2IF translator. The IF is then given as input to one of
the four backends to produce output, which has various sections
highlighting whether the designed scheme is safe or unsafe against
an adversary.
The registration, login, authentication and session key agreement phases of our scheme are implemented in HLPSL. In our
implementation, four basic roles are defined: registration authority, user, gateway node and smart device for representing the RA,
a user Ui , the GW N and a smart device SDj , respectively. The
HLPSL role specification user for Ui is given in Fig. 5. Ui as
an initiator receives the start signal, updates its state from 0 to 1,
and sends the registration request hIDi , RP Wi i to the RA using
Snd( ) channel securely. The RA accepts the registration request
of Ui , and sends information hAi , T IDi i to Ui using Snd( )
channel securely. Ui then receives information hAi , T IDi i using
Rcv( ) channel securely. Ui sends the login request hT IDi , M2 ,
M3 , T1 i to the GW N using public channel. The GW N further
sends the authentication request hM7 , M8 , T2 i to SDj using
public channel. The SDj also sends reply message hM10 , M11 ,
M12 , T3 i to the GW N using public channel. Finally, the GW N
sends authentication reply hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i to Ui using
public channel. Both Snd( ) and Rcv( ) public channels use
Dolev-Yao threat model type [9]. So, an intruder (always denoted
by (i)) can read, modify or delete the contents of exchanged
messages. Similarly, we also have specified the roles for RA,
GW N and SDj in our HLPSL implementation.
In the session role specified in Fig. 6, all the basic roles are
started with concrete arguments. Fig. 6 also consists of top level
environment role, which is the starting point for the execution.
At the end, in the goal section, four authentication goals and two
secrecy goals are specified.
The declaration witness(U i, GW N, ui gwn t1, T 1′ ) says
that Ui has freshly generated the current timestamp T1 for
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GW N . The declaration request(GW N, U i, gwn ui t4, T 4′ )
expresses Ui ’s acceptance of timestamp T4 generated for Ui by
GW N . The declaration secret({P W i, A′ , R′ }, sr1, U i) also
says that the information P Wi , a and r are only known to Ui .
This is specified with protocol id sr1 in the goal section (given in
Fig. 6).
role session (Ui, RA, GWN, SDj: agent, H: hash_func, SKuira: symmetric_key)
def=
local S1, R1, S2, R2, S3, R3, S4, R4: channel (dy)
composition
user (Ui, RA, GWN, SDj, H, SKuira, S1, R1)
/\ registrationauthority(Ui, RA, GWN, SDj, H, SKuira, S2, R2)
/\ gatewaynode (Ui, RA, GWN, SDj, H, SKuira, S3, R3)
/\ smartdevice (Ui, RA, GWN, SDj, H, SKuira, S2, R2)
end role
role environment()
def=
const ui, ra, gwn, sdj: agent, h: hash_func, skuira: symmetric_key,
kgwnui, kgwnsdj, idi, idsnj, idgwn, t1, t2, t3, t4, tidi, tidinew: text,
gen, rep: hash_func, ui_gwn_t1, ui_gwn_rui, gwn_sdj_t2, gwn_sdj_rgwn,
sdj_gwn_t3, sdj_gwn_rsdj, sr1, s2: protocol_id
intruder_knowledge ={t1, t2, t3, t4, h, gen, rep}
composition
session(ui, ra, gwn, sdj, h, skuira) /\ session(i, ra, gwn, sdj, h, skuira)
/\ session(ui, i, gwn, sdj, h, skuira) /\ session(ui, ra, i, sdj, h, skuira)
/\ session(ui, ra, gwn, i, h, skuira)
end role
goal
secrecy_of sr1, sr2
authentication_on ui_gwn_t1, ui_gwn_rui, gwn_sdj_t2
authentication_on gwn_sdj_rgwn, sdj_gwn_t3, sdj_gwn_rsdj
authentication_on gwn_ui_t4, gwn_ui_tidinew
end goal
environment()

Fig. 6. The session, goal and environment roles in HLPSL

We have simulated our scheme using the widely-used OFMC
and CL-AtSe backends. The executability check on non-trivial
HLPSL specifications, replay attack check, and Dolev-Yao model
check are verified in the proposed scheme. For more details on
these verifications, one can refer to [31], [40]. The simulation
results shown in Fig. 7 depicts that the proposed scheme is secure
against replay as well as man-in-the-middle attacks.
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
C:\progra~1\SPAN\testsuite
\results\user_auth.if
GOAL
as_specified
BACKEND
OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
parseTime: 0.00s
searchTime: 7.75s
visitedNodes: 1432 nodes
depth: 8 plies

SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
TYPED_MODEL
PROTOCOL
C:\progra~1\SPAN\testsuite
\results\user_auth.if
GOAL
As Specified
BACKEND
CL−AtSe
STATISTICS
Analysed : 8 states
Reachable : 0 states
Translation: 0.14 seconds
Computation: 0.00 seconds

Fig. 7. The results of the analysis using OFMC and CL-AtSe backends

5.3

Informal Security Analysis

The informal security analysis shows that the following other
possible known attacks are prevented.
5.3.1

Traceability

In many applications, it is desirable that a user authentication
should not allow an adversary to trace a user during login and
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authentication phases. Therefore, it also becomes important that
the identity of the user should no be revealed to an adversary to
preserve the privacy of that user in a network, especially in a smart
home environment. The login request hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i sent
by Ui to the GW N is different each time due to the following
reason. The smart phone SPi of Ui computes M1 = A∗ ⊕
RP Wi∗ = h(IDi || KGW N −Ui ), M2 = M1 ⊕ rUi and M3 =
h(M2 || T1 || IDi || T IDi || rUi ), where T1 is current timestamp
and rUi random nonce of Ui . The involvement of T1 and rUi
ensures that M2 and M3 are distinct for each session. Moreover,
other exchanged messages hM7 , M8 , T2 i, hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i
and hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i are also different for each session
due to the use of timestamps and random nonces. In addition, our
scheme allows to update old T IDi with a new T IDinew for each
session while the message hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i is sent to
Ui by the GW N . After receiving the message, SPi of the user
Ui calculates T IDinew = M15 ⊕ h(T IDi ||M1 ||T3 ||T4 ) and
replaces T IDi with T IDinew in its memory. Due to this, T IDi in
the login request messages are distinct for different sessions. Thus,
our scheme avoids traceability of Ui and SDj by an attacker.
5.3.2

Anonymity

Prior to sending the login request hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i to
the GW N , Ui hides its identity IDi in M1 = A∗ ⊕RP Wi∗
= h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ), M2 and M3 . The GW N also hides
the identities of Ui and SDj as it computes M6 = h(IDSDj ||
KGW N −SDj ), M7 = EM6 [IDi , IDGW N , rUi , rGW N , h(M4 )]
and M8 = h(M6 ||T2 ||IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rGW N )
and M14 = EM4 [rUi , rGW N , rSDj , IDSDj , IDGW N ,
h(M6 )]. SDj also hides its own identity by computing M10 =
h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) ||T3 )⊕ rSDj . If an attacker intercepts all the messages during login and authentication phases,
he/she is unable to identify IDi and IDSDj as these are protected by symmetric encryption and one-way cryptographic hash
function h(·). Therefore, the user and smart device anonymity are
preserved in our scheme.
5.3.3

Privileged-Insider Attack

Suppose A is a malicious insider user of the RA, who knows
IDi and RP Wi , which were sent to RA by Ui during his/her
registration phase. Note that RP Wi = h(P Wi ||σi ||a) ⊕r.
We assume that A obtains the smart phone SPi of Ui only after
the user registration phase is finished. A can then extract all the
information {T IDi , A∗i , Bi , Ci , τi , h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), t}
stored in SPi using the power analysis attacks [41]. Note that the
user Ui already deleted the information Ai from its smart phone
SPi at the end of the user registration phase described in Section
4.2. Hence, without having Ai , it is computationally hard for A to
derive the secret r as r = A∗i ⊕ Ai . As a result, without r, A can
not derive h(P Wi ||σi ||a) = RP Wi ⊕ r. Furthermore, without
knowing a, it is computationally infeasible to derive the biometric
key σi as h(IDi ||σi ) = Bi ⊕ a. As a consequence, without
having a, σi and KGW N −Ui , it is also computationally hard for
A to guess correctly the password P Wi of Ui from Ci = h(IDi
||RP Wi′ ||σi ) = h(IDi ||(h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕h(P Wi ||σi
||a)) ||σi ). In summary, it is computationally hard for A to guess
and verify correctly P Wi and σi from RP Wi , A∗i , Bi and Ci due
to the collision resistant property of h(·). Therefore, our scheme
is secure against the privileged-insider attack.
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5.3.4 Stolen Smart Phone Attack
Suppose the smart phone SPi of Ui is lost or stolen by an attacker
A. A can then extract all information hT IDi , A∗i , Bi , Ci , τi ,
h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), ti stored in SPi using the power analysis
attacks [41]. Note that Bi = h(IDi ||σi ) ⊕a, RP Wi′ = RP Wi ⊕
r = h(P Wi ||σi ||a), Ci = h(IDi ||RP Wi′ ||σi ) and A∗i =
Ai ⊕ r = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕RP Wi′ . To correctly guess
IDi and P Wi from Bi and Ci respectively, A needs to know
both a and r. Again, to know a from Bi , A needs both IDi and
P Wi . Thus, it is computationally infeasible for A to correctly
guess both IDi and P Wi as IDi and P Wi are protected by
the one-way hash function h(·). Therefore, our scheme is secure
against such an attack.
5.3.5 Session Key Security
The session key SKij = h[IDi || IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rUi
||rGW N ||rSDj ||h(M4 ) ||h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ))] is
calculated by both Ui and SDj . The message {M10 , M11 ,
M12 , T3 } sent by SDj to GW N contains session key SKij
as M11 = h(SKij ||T3 ). Suppose an attacker A intercepts
′
this message and tries to compute the session key SKij
′
′
= h[IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||rUi ||rGW N ||rSDj ||h(M4 )
||h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ))] by generating the random nonces
′
′
′
′
, rGW
rU
N , rSDj and timestamp T3 . However, the computai
′
tion of SKij is not possible for A because he/she does not
know the various identities IDi , IDSDj , IDGW N , secret key
KGW N −SDj , M4′ = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ). Without the knowledge of these parameters, and due to the collision resistance
′
property of h(·), it is very difficult for A to obtain SKij
.
Therefore, our scheme preserves the session key security.
5.3.6 User Impersonation Attack
Suppose there is an adversary A, who has the lost/stolen smart
phone SPi of a legal user Ui , and knows all the information stored
in SPi by the help of power analysis attacks [41]. Assume that A
intercepts Ui ’s login request hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i and tries to
create another valid login request, say hT IDi , M2′ , M3′ , T1′ i on
behalf of Ui , using the current timestamp T1′ of his/her system. To
compute M2′ , M1′ is required to compute as M1′ = A∗ ⊕ RP Wi∗
′
= h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ). Suppose A generates random nonce rU
.
i
′
′
′
′
′
′
To calculate M2 = M1 ⊕ rUi and M3 = h(M2 ||T1 || IDi ||
′
T IDi ||rU
), A needs IDi and KGW N −Ui , which are infeasible
i
for him/her to obtain them. Due to the one-way hash function h(·),
it is computationally infeasible for A to create valid login request
hT IDi , M2′ , M3′ , T1′ i on behalf of Ui , even he/she knows the
all information from the lost/stolen SPi . So, it is clear that our
scheme is secure against the user impersonation attack.
5.3.7 GWN Impersonation Attack
Suppose an adversary A intercepts the messages hM7 , M8 , T2 i
and hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i, and attempts to create other valid
′
′
′
, M15
, M16
, T3′ , T4′ i
messages, say hM7′ , M8′ , T2′ i and hM14
on behalf of the GW N , where M7 = EM6 [IDi , IDGW N ,
rUi , rGW N , h(M4 )], M6 = h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ), M4
= h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) and M8 = h(M6 ||T2 ||IDi ||IDSDj
||IDGW N ||rGW N ), M14 = EM4 [rUi , rGW N , rSDj , IDSDj ,
IDGW N , h(M6 )], M15 = T IDinew ⊕h(T IDi ||M4 ||T3 ||T4 ),
′
′
, rGW
M16 = h(M11 ||T4 ||rU ). Suppose T2′ , T3′ , T4′ and rU
N,
i
′
are
the
current
timestamps
and
different
random
nonces
rSD
j
generated by A. To compute M7′ , M6′ , M4′ and M8′ , the secret key

11

KGW N −SDj , and various identities IDi , IDSDj and IDGW N
′
′
′
are required. To calculate M14
, M15
and M16
, the secret key
KGW N −Ui , and various identities T IDi , IDi , IDSDj and
′
IDGW
N are required. Moreover, the messages are protected by
the one-way hash function h(·). Thus, A is not able to create
′
′
′
other valid messages hM7′ , M8′ , T2′ i, hM14
, M15
, M16
, T3′ , T4′ i
on behalf of the GW N . Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure
against the GW N impersonation attack.
5.3.8 Smart Device Impersonation Attack
Suppose an adversary A intercepts the message hM10 , M11 , M12 ,
′
′
T3 i and attempts to create another valid message, say hM10
, M11
,
′
′
′
M12 , T3 i on behalf of the smart device SDj , where T3 is the
current timestamp of A’s system when this message is created.
′
′
,
Note that M10
= h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) ||T3′ ) ⊕rSD
j
′
′
′
′
M11 = h(SKij ||T3 ), SKij = h[IDi ||IDSDj ||IDGW N
′
′
′
||rGW
||rU
N ||rSDj ||h(M4 ) ||h(h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ))],
i
′
′
′
′
′
M12 = h(rSDj ||rGW
N ||IDSDj ||IDGW N ||T3 ) and M4
′
′
′
= h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ), where rUi , rGW N and rSDj are the ran′
′
′
dom nonces created by A. To calculate M10
, M11
and M12
, the
secret keys KGW N −SDj and h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ), and various
identities IDi , IDSDj and IDGW N are necessary. Therefore,
′
′
′
,
, M12
, M11
A is not able to create another valid message hM10
′
T3 i on behalf of SDj . This confirms that the proposed scheme is
secure against this attack.
5.3.9 Resilience against Smart Device Capture Attack
Suppose a smart device SDj is physically captured by an attacker
A. Each SDj contains the information {IDSDj , h(IDSDj
||KGW N −SDj )}. Since each KGW N −SDj is distinct, h(IDSDj
||KGW N −SDj ) is also distinct for each SDj . If A tries to extract
KGW N −SDj from h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ) using IDSDj , it is
difficult task for A to compute KGW N −SDj as KGW N −SDj is
a long 1024-bit secret key. However, A can know the session key
SKij shared with the legal user Ui , which is stored in SDj ’s
memory. Thus, compromise of this particular smart device SDj
in the smart home network does not lead to compromise of the
session keys between that Ui and other non-compromised smart
devices SDl ’s as the stored h(IDSDl ||KGW N −SDl ) is distinct
for SDl . The proposed scheme is then unconditionally secure
against this attack.
5.3.10 Gateway Bypass Attack
In our scheme, both Ui and SDj can not bypass the GW N due
to the following argument. Ui can only send the login request
through the GW N , and SDj can send the authentication response
only through the GW N . Both Ui and SDj also establish the
session key SKij through the GW N . When the GW N receives
login request from Ui , it computes M7 = EM6 [IDi , IDGW N ,
∗
rU
, rGW N , h(M4 )] and M8 = h(M6 ||T2 ||IDi ||IDSDj
i
||IDGW N ||rGW N ) and sends hM7 , M8 , T2 i to SDj , where M6
= h(IDSDj ||KGW N −SDj ), and T2 is the current timestamp
generated by Ui . Ui can not compute M6 as he/she does not know
KGW N −SDj and it is only known to the GW N . Therefore, Ui
is not able to compute M7 and M8 . When the GW N receives
∗
,
authentication reply from SDj , it computes M14 = EM4 [rU
i
∗
new
rGW N , rSDj , IDSDj , IDGW N , h(M6 )], M15 = T IDi
∗
⊕h(T IDi ||M4 ||T3 ||T4 ), M16 = h(M11 ||T4 ||rU
) and sends
i
the message hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i to Ui . SDj can not
compute M4 as he/she does not know KGW N −Ui . Therefore,
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SDj can not compute M14 and M15 . To compute M16 , even if
SDj chooses current timestamp T4′ to compute M16 = h(M11
∗
||T4′ ||rU
), but he/she does not know the random nonce rUi ∗ of
i
the user Ui . So, SDj can not compute M14 , M15 and M16 . As a
result, neither Ui nor GW N bypass the GW N in our proposed
scheme.
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example, somebody is walking in the garden and accessing SDj ,
or somebody is driving the card and accessing SDj ). The speeds
for these smart home users are considered as 2, 10 and 15 mps,
respectively.

6.2 Simulation Environment
5.3.11 Offline-Dictionary Attack
We consider an interesting attack scenario in our proposed scheme
as illustrated by Huang et al. [34] to verify whether an adversary
A can derive the password of a legal user Ui or not. As in [34],
we also consider the following attacking scenario as follows.
•

•

•

At time T1 , suppose Ui invokes the password and biometric update phase to change the password to P Wi1 . At the
end of this phase, the smart phone SPi of Ui contains
the information hT IDi , A∗i , Bi , Ci , τi , h(·), Gen(·),
Rep(·), ti, where A∗i = h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕h(P Wi1
||σi1 ||a) and σi1 is the biometric key derived from the
new biometrics BIOi1 entered by Ui at this time.
At some time later (say, T2 ), Ui again changes his/her
password P W1 to a new password P W2 . At the end of
this phase, the SPi of Ui contains the information hT IDi ,
∗∗
A∗∗
i , Bi , Ci , τi , h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), ti, where Ai
= h(IDi ||KGW N −Ui ) ⊕h(P Wi2 ||σi2 ||a) and σi2 is
the biometric key derived from the new biometrics BIOi2
entered by Ui at this time T2 .
A passive adversary A with smart phone can obtain the
data stored in the smart phone at time T1 and T2 .

∗∗
∗
Now, given (A∗i , A∗∗
i ), A can calculate Ai ⊕ Ai = h(P Wi1
||σ1 ||a) ⊕h(P Wi2 ||σi2 ||a). By testing all password pairs
in the password dictionary, A can try to find at least one pair
(pw1 , pw2 ) such that A∗i ⊕ A∗∗
i = h(pw1 ||σi1 ||a) ⊕h(pw2
||σi2 ||a). However, to satisfy this condition, A further needs to
guess correctly the biometric keys pair (σi1 , σi2 ). In addition, A
also needs the random secret a which is only known to Ui . To
derive a, A requires to guess the biometric key too. Thus, without
having the biometric keys pair (σi1 , σi2 ) and random secret a,
it is computationally infeasible problem for A to verify whether
the guessed passwords pair (pw1 , pw2 ) is correct or not. As a
result, the proposed scheme has the ability to protect the offlinedictionary attack described in [34].

We have considered the following three network scenarios in the
simulation. For all the scenarios, we have taken one GW N and
50 SDj s.
Scenario 1. In this case, we have taken two users (Ui s): one is
static and other one is moving with 2 mps.
Scenario 2. In this case, we have taken three users (Ui s): one
is static and other two are moving with the speeds of 2 mps and
15 mps, respectively.
Scenario 3. In this case, we have taken eight users (Ui s): four
are static and other four are moving with the speeds of 2 mps, 2
mps, 10 mps and 15 mps, respectively.
Moreover, we assume that the bit lengths of the identity,
hash output (if we use SHA-1 hash algorithm) and random
number/nonce are 128, 160 and 128 bits, respectively. In each
scenario, we have considered the following messages between
different network entities: hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i, hM7 , M8 , T2 i,
hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i and hM14 , M15 , M16 , T3 , T4 i of sizes
480 bits, 960 bits, 512 bits and 1280 bits, respectively.
TABLE 2
Various simulation parameters
Parameter
Platform
Network coverage area
Network scenarios
Number of users (Ui )
Number of gateway nodes (GW N )
Number of smart devices (SDj )
Mobility
Simulation time
Routing protocol
Communication range of GW N
Communication range of SDj

Description
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
400 × 200 m2
1, 2 and 3
2, 3, 8 for scenarios 1, 2, 3
1 for all scenarios
50 for all scenarios
2 mps, 10 mps, 15 mps
1800 seconds
AODV
200 m
50 m

6.3 Simulation Results and Discussions

6

P RACTICAL P ERSPECTIVE : NS2 S IMULATION

The proposed scheme is simulated using the widely-accepted
networking simulation tool, NS2 2.35 simulator [16] on Ubuntu
14.04 LTS platform.

The network performance parameters, such as end-to-end delay
(in seconds) and throughput (in bps) are calculated during the
simulation.
6.3.1

6.1

Simulation Parameters

The various simulation parameters are given in Table 2. The network coverage area is taken as 400×200 m2 . The communication
ranges of the gateway node (GW N ) and smart devices (SDj ) are
taken as 200m and 50m, respectively. The network simulation
time is taken as 1800 seconds (30 minutes). The traditional Ad
hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol is
used as the routing protocol. Two types of users are taken in
the simulation: first type consists of the static users, who do not
move (for example, some smart home users seat on the chair
and access SDj ), while the second type has moving users (for

Impact on End-to-end Delay

The end-to-end delay (EED) is calculated as the average time
taken by the data packets to arrive at the destination from the
source. The EEDs of our scheme for different scenarios are
given Fig. 8(a). The EEDs are 0.29832, 0.28687 and 0.28637
seconds for the network scenarios 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Note
that the EED decreases in the scenarios 2 and 3, because in
these scenarios we have considered more number of mobile users
who are traveling towards the gateway node as compared to the
scenario 1. For this reason, the EED reduces as the distance
between the gateway node and mobile users decreases which
affects the reducibility of the EEDs accordingly.
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TABLE 3
Communication cost comparisons

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
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1

2
scenarios

Scheme
Kumar et al. [5]
Vaidya et al. [21]
Kim-Kim [22]
Jeong et al. [20]
Santoso-Vun [25]
Our

3

Total messages
3
2
2
2
3
4

Total cost (bits)
1696
2272
4352
1568
4416
3232

Fig. 8. (a) End-to-end delay (b) Throughput

6.3.2 Impact on Throughput
The throughput is measured as the number of bits transmitted per
unit time. Fig. 8(b) depicts the network throughput (in bps) of our
scheme under different network scenarios. The throughput values
are 197.56, 303.87 and 793.78 bps for the scenarios 1, 2 and 3,
receptively. Note that the throughput increases with an increase
in the number of users. Due to the large number of users, more
number of messages are exchanged in the network, and as a result,
the throughput also increases.

7

P ERFORMANCE C OMPARISON

In this section, the proposed scheme is compared with related
existing schemes of Kumar et al. [5], Vaidya et al. [21], Kim and
Kim [22], Jeong et al. [20], and Santoso and Vun [25] during
the login, and authentication and key agreement phases. Since the
registration, and password and biometric update phases are not
frequent, the costs involved in these phases are not discussed.
The communication costs of different existing schemes and our
scheme are compared in Table 3. We have made a reasonable assumption that the identities are 128 bits in length; random nonces
are 128 bits; timestamps are 32 bits; plaintext/ciphertext block in
symmetric encryption/decryption (using AES-CBC algorithm) is
128 bits, and the hash digest is of 160 bits (if we use SHA-1 as
h(·) [42]). By considering these values, the communication costs
for the schemes of Kumar et al., Vaidya et al., Kim-Kim, Jeong
et al., Santoso-Vun and our scheme are 1696, 2272, 4352, 1568,
4416, and 3232 bits, respectively. Note that in our scheme, the
messages M SG1 = hT IDi , M2 , M3 , T1 i, M SG2 = hM7 , M8 ,
T2 i, M SG3 = hM10 , M11 , M12 , T3 i, M SG4 = hM14 , M15 ,
M16 , T3 , T4 i are used. The cost of M7 is ⌈(128+ 128+ 128+
128+ 160) /128⌉ ×128 = 768 bits. Similarly, M14 needs ⌈(128
+128 +128 +128 +128 +160) /128⌉ ×128 = 896 bits. So,
the communication costs of different messages M SG1 , M SG2 ,
M SG3 and M SG4 are 480 bits, 960 bits, 512 bits, and 1280
bits, respectively. As a result, the total communication cost of
the proposed scheme turns out to be (480+ 960+ 512+ 1280)
= 3232 bits. Though our scheme requires more communication
cost as compared to that for the schemes of Kumar et al., Vaidya et
al. and Jeong et al., it is justified as our scheme supports additional
functionality and security features (see Table 5).
In Table 4, we have used the notations Texp , TE /TD , Th , Tf e ,
Tmac and Thmac to denote the computational time for modular
exponentiation operation, symmetric encryption/decryption, hash
function h(·) (using SHA-1 hashing algorithm), Gen(·)/Rep(·),
message authentication code (MAC) and hashed MAC, respectively. The bitwise XOR operation execution time is negligible,
and we do not consider it as a performance evaluation parameter.
The existing experimental values of these operations are given as
follows in [43], [44]: Texp , Th , TE /TD , and Tf e are 0.0192s,

0.00032s, 0.0056s and 0.0171s, respectively. It is further assumed that Tmac ≈ Thmac ≈ Th . The computational costs of
various schemes are given in Table 4. The total computational
cost for our scheme is 22Th + 4TE /TD +Tf e , whereas the
computational cost for a smart device is 7Th + TD ≈ 7.84ms
only. This indicates that our scheme is suitable for resourceconstrained smart devices. The computation cost of our scheme
is more than that for the schemes of Kumar et al., Vaidya et
al., Kim-Kim and Jeong et al., because we have used the fuzzy
extractor for providing additional security level of the system as
compared to other schemes. However, our scheme provides extra
functionality features and security features, and the cost for a
resource constrained smart device is low.
TABLE 4
Computation costs comparison
Scheme/phase
Kumar et al. [5]
Vaidya et al. [21]
Kim-Kim [22]
Jeong et al. [20]
Santoso-Vun [25]
Our

Total cost
2Th + Tmac
+1Thmac + 2TE /TD
20Th + 3TE /TD
30Th + 3TE /TD
10Th + 3TE /TD
2Th + 3Texp
22Th + 4TE /TD + Tf e

Rough estimation
12.48 ms
23.20 ms
26.40 ms
20.00 ms
58.24 ms
46.54 ms

Finally, the functionality and security features comparison
among our scheme and other schemes is shown in Table 5. The
scheme of Vaidya et al. is insecure against privileged-insider, password guessing, and smart device capture attacks, and it does not
have the traceability, user anonymity and smart device anonymity
properties. Moreover, the dynamic smart device addition phase,
offline smart device registration phase, formal security proof under
standard model and formal security verification using AVISPA are
not supported in their scheme. Kim-Kim’s scheme is vulnerable
to password guessing attack, password change attcak, privilegedinsider attack, user impersonation attack through privilegedinsider attack and smart device capture attack, and it does not
have traceability, user anonymity and smart device anonymity
properties. Additionally, the dynamic smart device addition phase,
offline smart device registration phase, formal security proof under
the ROR model and formal security verification using AVISPA are
not available in Kim-Kim’s scheme. Kumar et al. does not support
traceability and gateway anonymity properties and it does not
provide formal security proof under the ROR model. The schemes
of Kumar et al., Jeong et al. and Santoso-Vun also lack the
functionality features, which are shown in Table 5. In summary,
our scheme provides significantly better security and functionality
features as compared to those for other existing schemes.
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C ONCLUSION

This paper presents a new scheme to address the user authentication issue in a smart home environment. The proposed scheme
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TABLE 5
Security and functionality features comparison

Functionality features
SF F1
SF F2
SF F3
SF F4
SF F5
SF F6
SF F7
SF F8
SF F9
SF F10
SF F11
SF F12
SF F13
SF F14
SF F15
SF F16
SF F17
SF F18
SF F19
SF F20
SF F21
SF F22
SF F23
SF F24
SF F25

[5]
X
×
×
X
×
N/A
N/A
X
N/A
×
X
X
X
X
N/A
N/A
X
X
X
X
X
N/A
N/A
×
X

[21]
×
×
X
X
×
×
X
×
×
×
×
X
×
X
×
X
X
X
X
×
×
X
×
×
×

[22]
×
×
X
X
×
×
×
×
×
X
×
X
×
X
X
×
X
X
X
×
×
X
×
×
×

[20]
×
×
X
X
×
×
×
×
×
X
×
X
×
X
×
×
X
X
X
×
×
X
×
×
×

[25]
×
X
×
X
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
X
X
X
×
×
X
X
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
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[3]

Our
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Note: SF F1 : mutual authentication between GW N and smart device; SF F2 :
mutual authentication between user and smart device; SF F3 : mutual authentication between user and GW N ; SF F4 : key agreement; SF F5 : traceability
property; SF F6 : password guessing attack; SF F7 : password change attack;
SF F8 : dynamic smart device addition phase; SF F9 : user anonymity property; SF F10 : GW N anonymity property; SF F11 : smart device anonymity
property; SF F12 : replay attack; SF F13 : privileged-insider attack; SF F14 :
man-in-the-middle attack; SF F15 : stolen smart phone/smart card attack;
SF F16 : user impersonation attack; SF F17 : smart device impersonation attack; SF F18 : GWN bypassing attack; SF F19 : DoS attack; SF F20 : resilient
against smart device capture attack; SF F21 : offline smart device registration
phase; SF F22 : password change phase; SF F23 : biometric update phase;
SF F24 : formal security proof under ROR model; SF F25 : formal security
verification using AVISPA.
X: the scheme is secure or supports a particular functionality/security feature;
×: the scheme is not secure or does not support a particular functionality/security feature. N/A: not applicable in the scheme.

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]
[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]
[16]
[17]

provides additional functionality features. The proposed scheme
is secure against several known attacks, which are shown through
random oracle model, informal security and AVISPA tool. The
practical implementation of the proposed scheme is also demonstrated though the widely-accepted NS-2 simulator. Overall, the
proposed scheme provides a better trade-off between security
and functionality features provided in Table 5, and overheads as
compared to other existing related schemes.
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